Return to low growth equilibrium
The economy has returned to its pre-pandemic levels and, in the face of several headwinds, will struggle to break away from near-stagnant growth rates. Chief among these are the delayed effects of ECB monetary tightening, which will continue weighing on the borrowing costs of households, firms and the state. Falling demand for housing and the dwindling backlog of projects cleared under the scrapped “superbonus” tax scheme will constrain construction activity. Private investment, more broadly, will intensify its slowdown, while public investment growth will provide resilience (with downside risk related to potential delays in EU-funded projects). Supported by easing supply pressures, manufacturing exports will continue to grow, albeit at a slower pace as wage catch-up erodes competitiveness and global demand cools down (notably in Germany and China). Service exports, on the other hand, will remain buoyant as demand for tourism continues to grow, resulting in a positive contribution to growth from the external sector. The tight labour market will cushion the effects of inflation on household income, and therefore on private consumption. Inflation will continue moderating but remain above the 2% target due to a persistent core component. Government consumption will be a drag on growth owing to the full phase-out of energy support measures and lower spending on intermediate consumption.
Fiscal outlook improves but remains vulnerable
Italy has the highest public debt burden in Europe apart from Greece and, as such, faces significant fiscal challenges. Unlike Greece, where debt is largely owed to official creditors, a non-trivial share of Italian debt (around 20%) is owned by foreign private investors, leaving it exposed to speculative attacks. Though the situation has improved, Italian banks remain strongly exposed to the sovereign (16% of assets, down from pandemic peak of 19%, and significantly above eurozone average of 6%), meaning the risk of the bank-sovereign nexus remains latent. Otherwise, the banking system is well capitalised (CET1 ratio of 15%), highly liquid (net stable funding ratio of 133%) and holds a solid asset portfolio (NPL ratio of 1%). The state, on the other hand, is exposed to the private sector through contingent liabilities, which amount to 16% of GDP, the vast majority of which are Covid-related. Thus far, these loans have exhibited a low NPL ratio of 2%, but their creditworthiness will be put to the test in 2026-2027 when most of them fall due. All these debt pressures will be aggravated by a “higher-for-longer” interest rate environment. Nonetheless, sovereign risk is strongly mitigated by the ECB’s willingness to purchase stressed Italian bonds provided that the government respects fiscal and reform conditions agreed with the EU.
The budget deficit will continue its narrowing path as the phase-out of pandemic and energy crisis support measures is completed. The deficit will also be supported by higher nominal growth, the cancellation of the “citizen’s income” welfare scheme and the “superbonus” tax incentive. The primary balance is expected to switch to a slight surplus in 2024.
On the back of moderating energy prices, import inflation is rapidly reversing, which, given Italy’s reliable export growth will restore the current account surplus. Nonetheless, the stronger role played by domestic demand (and investment in particular) and structurally higher energy prices will prevent it from returning to its pre-pandemic levels of around 3%.
Reform agenda and fiscal pressures will put the government to the test
Following the collapse of the technocratic Draghi administration in July 2022, a right-wing coalition secured a comfortable victory (43% of the vote) in the September 2022 snap elections. The new government is led by Giorgia Meloni, whose Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) secured 26% of the vote. She is joined by Forza Italia (8% of the vote) and Lega Nord (9%). After a prolonged period of volatility involving a string of unstable coalitions, the FdI appears to be consolidating the conservative vote. Given the weakness of centrist and progressive parties (Partido Democratico and 5SM), policy pragmatism and the economy’s resilient performance, the Meloni government has a good chance of serving a full mandate that is due to end in 2027. However, if these trends fail to hold and FdI loses significant popular support, snap elections would become probable as coalition partner and Lega leader Matteo Salvini would have an incentive to defect.
The strong dependence on European funds to finance investment is a strong incentive to comply with EU conditionality. Efforts to improve the business environment through structural reforms, fiscal consolidation and public investment are expected to continue. Nonetheless, the coalition’s inexperience in government and lingering populist tendencies create room for foot-dragging and unforced policy mistakes. This was the case with the poorly communicated and subsequently watered-down windfall tax on banks, which harmed investor confidence. Further delays in NGEU fund disbursements are expected as key reforms (taxi market liberalisation, tax evasion, court system efficiency) will be politically challenging, thereby creating fiscal and macroeconomic downside risk. Relationships with EU partners have been more collaborative than initially expected. Persistent and non-trivial risk of tensions regarding immigration and fiscal matters will remain, particularly in light of the fact that EU fiscal rules will reactivate in 2024.